पराभवाचे श्राद्ध..... भाग-६

हा भाग मला विशेष आवडला...आम्हा पामरांना घटनांवर आधारित इतिहासाची जास्त रुची वाटते. बाकी काँग्रेसचे विधवेचे राजकारण अजून सविस्तर कळाले...धन्यवाद...

हा भाग वाचताना अभिमानाने छाती फुलून न येते तर नवलच!

"पाच मिटर जमिनीच्या तुकड्यावर असलेल्या त्या खडकाची किंमत काय, हे तहात जे हरतात, किंवा जे आपल्या ताब्यातला भुभाग शत्रूला सहज देऊन टाकतात, त्यांना कशी कळावी"
--- या आपल्या वाक्याशी १००% सहमत. नेहरुंनी संसदेत अक्साई-चीन/सियाचेन बद्दल काढलेल्या षंढ उद्गारांची आठवण झाली. आपल्या पुचाट नेतृत्वाने मर्दानी सेनेचा चूकीचा वापर करुन देशाशी बेईमानीच केली असे सामान्य भारतीयांचे मत आहे ते उगीच नाही.

कर्नल आठवलेंच्या इतिहासाचे दाखाले इतिहासाच्या विद्यार्थांच्या अभ्यासक्रमातून सुद्धा गायब असतात ही सुद्धा एक अनाकलनीय बाब.

आतापर्यंतचा सर्वाधिक आवडलेला भाग.

लेफ्टनंट कर्नल चव्हाण यांचे वोलोंग, एका युद्धकैद्याची बखर हे पुस्तक वाचले आहे. चीन युद्धात ते देखील सामील होते त्यानंतर युद्धकैदी झाले. अनुभव अंगावर काटा आणणारा आहे. बाकी तुमचा लेख भन्नाट आहे, णो डावट!

फक्त दोन तीन ठिकाणी कदाचित चित्रे असावीत ती दिसत नाहीत.

हा भाग एकदम जबरदस्त. भारतीय सैनिकांच्या शौर्याला सलाम.

आधीच्या भागांनी दु:खी झालेल्या मनावर फुंकर घालण्याचे काम या भागाने केले. पुढील भागांची वाट पहात आहे.

सगळेच भाग वाचतो आहे,

काय काय करून आमच्यासारख्या हलकट लोकांना जिवंत आणि सुरक्षित ठेवण्याचे दुर्दैवी कर्तव्य करत असतात हे वाघ याची कल्पनाच करवत नाही,

वाचतोय...

निव्वळ अप्रतिम... मला हा भाग सगळ्यात जास्त आवडला... :)

भारतीय सैन्याच्या पराक्रमाच्या गाथा वाचून छाती अभिमानाने फुलून आली नाही तर नवलंच !!!

पुढच्या भागाची वाट बघतोय....

आतापर्यंत सगळे निराश करणारे प्रसंग वाचून आता आपल्या सैन्याचं खरं रूप दाखवणारा हा भाग खूपच आवडला.

संपूर्ण लेखमाला अप्रतिम. शेवटचा भाग म्हणजे लेखमालेची योग्य सांगता असं म्हणता येईल. सैनीकांना कोणत्या परिस्थितीत लढावे लागते ह्याची आम्हाला काहीच कल्पना नसते. त्यावरही बराच प्रकाश पडला. एक संग्राह्य लेखमाला असं हिचं वर्णन मी करीन.

.

त्या निर्जन भागात त्या पाच मिटर जमिनीच्या तुकड्यावर असलेल्या त्या खडकाची किंमत काय, हे तहात जे हरतात, किंवा जे आपल्या ताब्यातला भुभाग शत्रूला सहज देऊन टाकतात, त्यांना कशी कळावी ...............?

खरेच! या पार्श्वभूमीवर "तिथे गवताचे पातेही उगवत नाही ..." हे लडाखबद्दल नेहरूंनी काढलेले उद्गार आठवले आणि त्यावर "माझ्या मस्तकावर एकही केस नाही म्हणून ते मी गमवायचे का?' असा ह. वि. कामतांनी केलेला समयोचित प्रतिप्रश्नही आठवला.

रंगलेल्या अप्रतिम लेखाबद्दल धन्यवाद.

सुधीर कांदळकर

स्टार माझावर १९६२चं युद्ध... दुर्दैवाची पन्नाशीहा माहितीपर व्हिडीयो पाहण्या सारखा आहे.

अप्रतिम लेखमाला. हा भाग तर भन्नाटच. विजयाच्या कथा नेहमीच जास्त आकर्षित करतात

हे सारे वाचताना आपल्या सैनिकांचा फार फार अभिमान वाटला. धन्यवाद.

अतिशय माहितीपूर्ण, रोचक आणि सुंदर लेखमाला. (एकाच फटक्यात सर्व भाग वाचले)
धन्यवाद कुलकर्णी काका

अंगावर रोमांचउबभे राहिले...!

जबराट...लैच भारी!

हा भाग छानच आहे. तुम्ही लेखाच्या सुरुवातिस ज्या नावाचा उल्लेख केलाय ते बहुधा कर्नल अनिल आठ्ल्ये असावेत्.उर्वरित भाग लवकरच वाचेन.

वायु सेनेचा १९६२ च्या युद्धात का उपयोग केला गेला नाही या विषयक काही माहिती आत्ताच माझ्या हाती आली आहे. वेळेअभावी इन्ग्रजितच ती उद्ध्रुत करत आहे.

By Air Marshal RS Bedi ( Why IAF was not employed in 62)

“The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock. Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected...” JK Galbraith (US Ambassador in India during the 1962 Indo-China War)”

Prime Minister Nehru wrote two letters in quick succession to the US President John F Kennedy on the night of November 19, 1962. The war situation had become desperate and India was at the verge of collapse with the Chinese troops having reached the foothills of NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal Pradesh). Bomdila had fallen and the retreating troops from Sela had been trapped between the two passes. Fear of Chinese coming down the valley and occupying the eastern sector had percolated down the line, creating an aura of panic and helplessness. The plans were afoot to evacuate major cities in Assam. This was the grim scenario under which Nehru wrote those two letters.

He asked for a comprehensive aid from the US that included immediate help of the US Air Force for the purpose of air defence of the eastern sector. For the Indian Air Force to be employed in offensive role against the Chinese on the war front, it was felt necessary to have the US Air Force to defend the eastern sector against the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air force as Chinese air force is known), should the Chinese retaliate by attacking Indian cities, oilfields and the industrial complexes in the region. The UK Prime Minister was also kept in the picture. However, by then the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and a phased withdrawal. Obviously, they must have met their limited objective as set at the outset of the war. Besides, they could ill afford to stay on with the passes getting snow bound in days to come. These letters made public recently betray Nehru’s fears and the state of helplessness, as also the deference with which he approaches the subject of help from the US President.

In the light of these letters, it has become necessary to re-visit the controversy surrounding this vital issue of non use of combat elements of the IAF, despite the overwhelming Chinese onslaught. The Army rightly feels aggrieved that despite the grave circumstances, the Air Force did not come to its rescue. Perhaps, had Nehru not been so influenced by US Ambassador, Galbraith’s advise and the IB boss, BN Mullick who had Nehru’s ears always, the outcome could well have been somewhat different. Whilst the former had Cold War compulsions in mind in advising Nehru the way he did, the latter was led to exaggerating the Chinese threat in the absence of real intelligence.

Lack of genuine intelligence with the government, as also the armed forces and consequent fear of Chinese retribution due to over assessment of their capabilities obviously led to this unfortunate decision. Thus, it was the fear of the unknown that created a sort of paranoia amongst the higher hierarchy in the govt which totally froze and took decisions and actions that did not bring much honour to the nation and its Prime Minister, as stands revealed now.

The US advice that it would be unwise to involve the combat elements of the IAF played a major role in arriving at this decision. The suggestion that the eastern cities and the air bases at Tezpur and Guwahati, Calcutta industrial complex, oil installation might become targets for the Chinese bombing unnerved the government. The intelligence about the Chinese having active air bases at Rudok, Gartok and Tashigong further added to the confusion. There are no such bases even today in 2010. Thus, the government was led to deciding in favour of not using the IAF in operations other than the logistic support to the army, lest it should result in some sort of disaster. The demand for twelve all weather supersonic fighter squadrons placed by highly paranoiac Nehru on President Kennedy also seems rather naive and not based on any sound professional advice. It was not a small number that somebody would have given us on a platter. Maj Gen Palit writes in his book “War in the High Himalayas” that when he was shown the draft letter as a DMO at the AHQ, seeking these fighter squadrons, he could only welcome the help in light of desperate circumstances, whatever its source. Whether the Air HQs were similarly consulted is not clear at all.

The Chinese were known to have only Mig-15, Mig-17, IL-28 bombers and a few Mig-19. Most airfields in Tibet are at high altitude and had inadequate infrastructure to take on offensive fighter operations. The IL-28 bomber was the only aircraft that could have posed some threat in the eastern sector. In fact, in 1962, the PLAAF was at its weakest. The Soviets had pulled out of China in August; 1960. Their aeronautical industry was in tatters. Their serviceability was low due to non-availability of spares and so also was perhaps their morale. According to some western estimates based upon inputs from the Chinese sources, the Chinese Air Force was nearly grounded due to total suspension of supplies and the spares by the Soviet Union. Discord with Taiwan was also keeping the Chinese engaged on the eastern board. Large contingent of army and air force were deployed there.

It may be mentioned here, though with the advantage of hindsight that during the period leading from the 62 war with India to its 1979 war with Vietnam, the PLAAF had shown a marked bias towards Air Defence as against Offensive Air Operations. That this was inspite of having more capable bomber like the Tu-16/H-6 at the time implies that this predilection towards Air Defence had more to do with their air force doctrine rather than the ‘short legs’ of its aircraft. Would it therefore, with the hindsight of course, be correct to say that the PLAAF in all likelihood would not have used its offensive power against Indian cities? This is a question that can perhaps never be answered

In comparison, India had technologically advance aircraft comprising Toofanis, Mysteres, Gnats, Hunters and the Canberras. Some of these aircraft were in location in the eastern sector already, though the Air Defence set up was rather rudimentary. With inherent flexibility that the air power has, it would have not taken much time for the IAF to reinforce the sector with requisite assets.

Unfortunately, the Air Force too was not as clear and certain as it ought to have been, due to the lack of requisite intelligence inputs. And that is the reason indeed for not having any in-depth study on Chinese capabilities in Tibet in hand prior to the start of war. Lack of intelligence on China’s capabilities and their intentions was obviously the limiting factor resulting in India not being as ready as required by the emerging scenario. The fear of Chinese retaliation seemed to have weighed so heavily that it coloured all our decisions. In light of the fact that the Henderson Brookes report is unlikely to be released for public scrutiny, the only source of information in this regard would be the few surviving senior officers of the day.

Ambassador Galbraith went to a great length in pressurising Nehru to desist from using combat aircraft against the Chinese which would widen the scope of the war. The US would not be able to support or provide any fighter cover. Galbraith could not have acted entirely on his own volition or hunch in advising Nehru so strongly without the backing from the home front. It could well have been the US military as also the CIA that were saying so. They had their own Cold War compulsions. Besides, the US was not very sure in regard to the extent of fissures in Sino-Soviet relations. However, what is of great interest is the fact that Prime Minister Nehru trusted Ambassador Galbraith without any trepidation whatsoever.

Writing in his journal later to be published as ‘Ambassador’s Journal’, on 19 Nov 62, the day Nehru dashed off his missives, Galbraith notes, “The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock .Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected... I think it would be very unwise for them to initiate any air action.” Then he goes to footnote this event by saying, “In the ensuing days, I urged against doing so in the strongest possible fashion”. In his next entry on 21 Nov 1962, he goes on to explain the logic behind his urgings, when he says, “The cities of the Gangetic Plain are accessible from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that the Indians could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet”. It is instructive to note that soon after this entry is an account of Galbraith’s 10 AM meeting with Prime Minister Nehru.

One of the main factors in the calculus of the Americans would have been the fact that the Cold War was at its peak with the Cuban missile crisis unfolding at this very juncture. Any clear siding with the Indians would have provoked the Soviets in some form or the other. That’s how the US did not want to be seen getting too involved on the Indian side. Any such perception would have brought the Soviets closer to the Chinese who had not yet fully parted company. The US on account of Cold War constraints obviously did not want another region getting embroiled in any major war and hence the advice to Nehru to avoid widening the scope of Sino-Indian conflict by employing its air power. Whether the US deliberately exaggerated the Chinese air threat is indeed debatable. The Soviets too could not afford to take a pro India stand in October 1962 because of their pre-occupation with the US on account of Cuban missile face off.

The unfortunate consequence of this canard being sowed deep into the minds of the Indian decision making elite was that it soon began acquiring a life of its own, as a section of the military came to believe that using the IAF offensively would lead to the PLAAF responding with operations to hinder the IAF’s air maintenance of the Indian Army on which it was extremely dependent. That’s how a few requests for close air support by some units engaged on the front with the Chinese were promptly turned down by the army authorities on these very grounds.

Despite Nehru’s entreaties, the US help was not forthcoming till after the end of the war, although there are references here and there in regard to the US aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) being present in the Indian Ocean and its movement towards the Bay of Bengal. The US in response to India’s request for help got the Commonwealth countries to come forward and support it in this effort. President Kennedy with the help of British Prime Minister Macmillan worked out a joint military aid package of the order of about $120 million or so for India. Other Commonwealth countries were too roped in to share this responsibility on the grounds that India was more familiar with British and the Commonwealth countries’ equipment and the weapon systems rather than that of the Americans’. The US help therefore, came in the form of non-combat equipment only. It thus became a support from the western powers and not necessarily from the US who was wary of the Soviets’ reaction.

Thus, Ex Shiksha was planned between the air forces of the US, UK, Canada and Australia in order to check the air defence of Delhi and the eastern sector. Later, the help materialised in the form of aircrafts and the equipment from these countries. Besides, the US agreed to train certain number of Indian pilots in US. The US also gave badly needed winter clothing, some transport aircraft and later 500 series Star Saphire air defence radars which were later deployed all along the Himalayas from the west to the far east. Canada sent a squadron of Caribous transport aircraft. UK too provided some support in the form of submarine training to one batch of Indian naval officers. Some of this came free, some on concessional rates and some on full payment.

Interestingly, a stage came when India was able to get the best from both the sides. Right till 1965 war, India was able to acquire major military hardware from the US as well as the Soviet Union. No wonder, India’s non-alignment policy came to be referred as ‘bi-alignment’. Questions about India’s foreign policy began to be raised all over, particularly in the western world. Even within the country, the eyebrows were raised that the architect of India’s non-alignment policy was seeking military intervention by the US forces. However, what really matters is the way one looks at it. National interest must remain paramount, ideology notwithstanding.

Where India went wrong was in its strategic assessment of Chinese intentions that they would not resort to war. But they did and caught us totally off guard. This shattered Nehru and his much coveted non-alignment policy. Being still in “Bhai Bhai, era,” even our intelligence could not adjust to the emerging adverse relationship. To add to the woes, Nehru’s proclivity of ignoring the armed forces that unfortunately remained in World War-II mould all this while till the Chinese shook us resulted in the nation paying this heavy price. However, what needs to be debated in India is as to who sowed the seeds of imagination in the minds of the Indian polity of the time. Nehru was obviously not advised correctly or professionally. The unexpected Chinese onslaught and consequent rout of the Indian Army led Nehru and his advisors to overestimate
Chinese politico-military objectives.

Could the Indian Air Force Have Tilted the Scales in the 1962 War With China?

In October 1962 the Chinese Army moved against Indian positions in the East and Ladakh. The positions which were lightly held gave way in the face of the Chinese assault. The so called Macmohan Line in the East was breached and the posts in Ladakh fell after some resistance. The Indian Army was taken totally by surprise. This soon turned into a ignominious retreat. One of the reasons was paucity of equipment, but a more important reason was the mindset of the General Staff that had been conditioned to think of only Pakistan as the probable opponent.

The result of the attack had a demoralizing effect on the Indian leadership and the Indian Army. This state of affairs can squarely laid at the doorstep of successive Army Chiefs right from General Cariappa to General Thapar who abandoned their duty in conditioning the Army to face China. No mountain exercise was ever conducted for the troops and the Staff College had only exercises on battles in the plains of Punjab and deserts of Rajasthan as possible scenarios of a conflict. The Indian Air Force at that time had a mix of Gnats, Hunters, Mystere's, Canberra's and MIG 21.

The Eastern Command was in existence, but the IAF never carried out any exercises for hill attacks and operations. All the exercises were carried out for operations in the plains. This is hard to stomach now and the role of successive Air Chiefs from Air Marshal S Mukherjee down wards needs evaluation. The IAF was not conditioned for any form of operation in the hills and the heights of the Himalayas. However the IAF was combat ready for operations in the plains. Thus when the PLA moved in a logical corollary would have been to use the IAF as a ground support to blunt the Chinese offensive. This however did not happen and the Army fought it's battle without Air Support. Thus the cardinal principle of Douhet was thrown to the winds.

It is a fact of history that the Indian Air Force did not take part in the operations. It has never been satisfactorily explained as to why the IAF was not used in close support operations. Who took the fatal decision not to deploy the IAF . Was it Nehru, the Army Chief General Thapar or the Air Chief. There is no answer to this question. Perhaps the only plausible answer is that fear of the unknown and retaliation by the PLAAF based in Tibet may have clouded the thought process. This shows a psychosis of fear that at that time pervaded the Indian Government and Armed Forces.

The Air Chief himself perhaps was too numbed by the turn of events. In addition the fact that the IAF had never even had a practice exercise in hill operations, must have weighed heavily on the Air Chief. For this alone Air Marshal Aspi Engineer must stand in the dock as he headed the IAF at that time. Another point is the psychosis of fear that was built up about the capability of the PLAAF which was greatly exaggerated. In real terms the Peoples Army Air Force had outdated aircraft which could not operate with full payload from the airfields in Tibet because of the height factor of the airfields.

All this is mentioned by Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwari in his article in the Indian Defense review. Much water has flowed down the river since then, but future generations must be made aware that the psychosis of fear must never govern a military decision. This is unfortunately what happened in 1962. As per AVM AK Tiwari 'In final analysis the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China.

भारतिय वायु सेनेचा १९६२ च्या युद्धात का उपयोग केला गेला नाही य बद्दल काही माहिती आत्ताच् हाती आली आहे. भाषान्तर करावयास वेळ लागेल म्हणुन इन्ग्रजीतच ती देत आहे.

By Air Marshal RS Bedi ( Why IAF was not employed in 62)

“The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock. Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected...” JK Galbraith (US Ambassador in India during the 1962 Indo-China War)”

Prime Minister Nehru wrote two letters in quick succession to the US President John F Kennedy on the night of November 19, 1962. The war situation had become desperate and India was at the verge of collapse with the Chinese troops having reached the foothills of NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal Pradesh). Bomdila had fallen and the retreating troops from Sela had been trapped between the two passes. Fear of Chinese coming down the valley and occupying the eastern sector had percolated down the line, creating an aura of panic and helplessness. The plans were afoot to evacuate major cities in Assam. This was the grim scenario under which Nehru wrote those two letters.

He asked for a comprehensive aid from the US that included immediate help of the US Air Force for the purpose of air defence of the eastern sector. For the Indian Air Force to be employed in offensive role against the Chinese on the war front, it was felt necessary to have the US Air Force to defend the eastern sector against the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air force as Chinese air force is known), should the Chinese retaliate by attacking Indian cities, oilfields and the industrial complexes in the region. The UK Prime Minister was also kept in the picture. However, by then the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and a phased withdrawal. Obviously, they must have met their limited objective as set at the outset of the war. Besides, they could ill afford to stay on with the passes getting snow bound in days to come. These letters made public recently betray Nehru’s fears and the state of helplessness, as also the deference with which he approaches the subject of help from the US President.

In the light of these letters, it has become necessary to re-visit the controversy surrounding this vital issue of non use of combat elements of the IAF, despite the overwhelming Chinese onslaught. The Army rightly feels aggrieved that despite the grave circumstances, the Air Force did not come to its rescue. Perhaps, had Nehru not been so influenced by US Ambassador, Galbraith’s advise and the IB boss, BN Mullick who had Nehru’s ears always, the outcome could well have been somewhat different. Whilst the former had Cold War compulsions in mind in advising Nehru the way he did, the latter was led to exaggerating the Chinese threat in the absence of real intelligence.

Lack of genuine intelligence with the government, as also the armed forces and consequent fear of Chinese retribution due to over assessment of their capabilities obviously led to this unfortunate decision. Thus, it was the fear of the unknown that created a sort of paranoia amongst the higher hierarchy in the govt which totally froze and took decisions and actions that did not bring much honour to the nation and its Prime Minister, as stands revealed now.

The US advice that it would be unwise to involve the combat elements of the IAF played a major role in arriving at this decision. The suggestion that the eastern cities and the air bases at Tezpur and Guwahati, Calcutta industrial complex, oil installation might become targets for the Chinese bombing unnerved the government. The intelligence about the Chinese having active air bases at Rudok, Gartok and Tashigong further added to the confusion. There are no such bases even today in 2010. Thus, the government was led to deciding in favour of not using the IAF in operations other than the logistic support to the army, lest it should result in some sort of disaster. The demand for twelve all weather supersonic fighter squadrons placed by highly paranoiac Nehru on President Kennedy also seems rather naive and not based on any sound professional advice. It was not a small number that somebody would have given us on a platter. Maj Gen Palit writes in his book “War in the High Himalayas” that when he was shown the draft letter as a DMO at the AHQ, seeking these fighter squadrons, he could only welcome the help in light of desperate circumstances, whatever its source. Whether the Air HQs were similarly consulted is not clear at all.

The Chinese were known to have only Mig-15, Mig-17, IL-28 bombers and a few Mig-19. Most airfields in Tibet are at high altitude and had inadequate infrastructure to take on offensive fighter operations. The IL-28 bomber was the only aircraft that could have posed some threat in the eastern sector. In fact, in 1962, the PLAAF was at its weakest. The Soviets had pulled out of China in August; 1960. Their aeronautical industry was in tatters. Their serviceability was low due to non-availability of spares and so also was perhaps their morale. According to some western estimates based upon inputs from the Chinese sources, the Chinese Air Force was nearly grounded due to total suspension of supplies and the spares by the Soviet Union. Discord with Taiwan was also keeping the Chinese engaged on the eastern board. Large contingent of army and air force were deployed there.

By Air Marshal RS Bedi ( Why IAF was not employed in 62)

“The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock. Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected...” JK Galbraith (US Ambassador in India during the 1962 Indo-China War)”

Prime Minister Nehru wrote two letters in quick succession to the US President John F Kennedy on the night of November 19, 1962. The war situation had become desperate and India was at the verge of collapse with the Chinese troops having reached the foothills of NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal Pradesh). Bomdila had fallen and the retreating troops from Sela had been trapped between the two passes. Fear of Chinese coming down the valley and occupying the eastern sector had percolated down the line, creating an aura of panic and helplessness. The plans were afoot to evacuate major cities in Assam. This was the grim scenario under which Nehru wrote those two letters.

1962 war pic 4

He asked for a comprehensive aid from the US that included immediate help of the US Air Force for the purpose of air defence of the eastern sector. For the Indian Air Force to be employed in offensive role against the Chinese on the war front, it was felt necessary to have the US Air Force to defend the eastern sector against the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air force as Chinese air force is known), should the Chinese retaliate by attacking Indian cities, oilfields and the industrial complexes in the region. The UK Prime Minister was also kept in the picture. However, by then the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and a phased withdrawal. Obviously, they must have met their limited objective as set at the outset of the war. Besides, they could ill afford to stay on with the passes getting snow bound in days to come. These letters made public recently betray Nehru’s fears and the state of helplessness, as also the deference with which he approaches the subject of help from the US President.

In the light of these letters, it has become necessary to re-visit the controversy surrounding this vital issue of non use of combat elements of the IAF, despite the overwhelming Chinese onslaught. The Army rightly feels aggrieved that despite the grave circumstances, the Air Force did not come to its rescue. Perhaps, had Nehru not been so influenced by US Ambassador, Galbraith’s advise and the IB boss, BN Mullick who had Nehru’s ears always, the outcome could well have been somewhat different. Whilst the former had Cold War compulsions in mind in advising Nehru the way he did, the latter was led to exaggerating the Chinese threat in the absence of real intelligence.

Lack of genuine intelligence with the government, as also the armed forces and consequent fear of Chinese retribution due to over assessment of their capabilities obviously led to this unfortunate decision. Thus, it was the fear of the unknown that created a sort of paranoia amongst the higher hierarchy in the govt which totally froze and took decisions and actions that did not bring much honour to the nation and its Prime Minister, as stands revealed now.

The US advice that it would be unwise to involve the combat elements of the IAF played a major role in arriving at this decision. The suggestion that the eastern cities and the air bases at Tezpur and Guwahati, Calcutta industrial complex, oil installation might become targets for the Chinese bombing unnerved the government. The intelligence about the Chinese having active air bases at Rudok, Gartok and Tashigong further added to the confusion. There are no such bases even today in 2010. Thus, the government was led to deciding in favour of not using the IAF in operations other than the logistic support to the army, lest it should result in some sort of disaster. The demand for twelve all weather supersonic fighter squadrons placed by highly paranoiac Nehru on President Kennedy also seems rather naive and not based on any sound professional advice. It was not a small number that somebody would have given us on a platter. Maj Gen Palit writes in his book “War in the High Himalayas” that when he was shown the draft letter as a DMO at the AHQ, seeking these fighter squadrons, he could only welcome the help in light of desperate circumstances, whatever its source. Whether the Air HQs were similarly consulted is not clear at all.

Also read: Why New Delhi wants to forget 1962?

The Chinese were known to have only Mig-15, Mig-17, IL-28 bombers and a few Mig-19. Most airfields in Tibet are at high altitude and had inadequate infrastructure to take on offensive fighter operations. The IL-28 bomber was the only aircraft that could have posed some threat in the eastern sector. In fact, in 1962, the PLAAF was at its weakest. The Soviets had pulled out of China in August; 1960. Their aeronautical industry was in tatters. Their serviceability was low due to non-availability of spares and so also was perhaps their morale. According to some western estimates based upon inputs from the Chinese sources, the Chinese Air Force was nearly grounded due to total suspension of supplies and the spares by the Soviet Union. Discord with Taiwan was also keeping the Chinese engaged on the eastern board. Large contingent of army and air force were deployed there.

1962 war pic 2

t may be mentioned here, though with the advantage of hindsight that during the period leading from the 62 war with India to its 1979 war with Vietnam, the PLAAF had shown a marked bias towards Air Defence as against Offensive Air Operations. That this was inspite of having more capable bomber like the Tu-16/H-6 at the time implies that this predilection towards Air Defence had more to do with their air force doctrine rather than the ‘short legs’ of its aircraft. Would it therefore, with the hindsight of course, be correct to say that the PLAAF in all likelihood would not have used its offensive power against Indian cities? This is a question that can perhaps never be answered

In comparison, India had technologically advance aircraft comprising Toofanis, Mysteres, Gnats, Hunters and the Canberras. Some of these aircraft were in location in the eastern sector already, though the Air Defence set up was rather rudimentary. With inherent flexibility that the air power has, it would have not taken much time for the IAF to reinforce the sector with requisite assets.

1962 war pic 3

Unfortunately, the Air Force too was not as clear and certain as it ought to have been, due to the lack of requisite intelligence inputs. And that is the reason indeed for not having any in-depth study on Chinese capabilities in Tibet in hand prior to the start of war. Lack of intelligence on China’s capabilities and their intentions was obviously the limiting factor resulting in India not being as ready as required by the emerging scenario. The fear of Chinese retaliation seemed to have weighed so heavily that it coloured all our decisions. In light of the fact that the Henderson Brookes report is unlikely to be released for public scrutiny, the only source of information in this regard would be the few surviving senior officers of the day.

Ambassador Galbraith went to a great length in pressurising Nehru to desist from using combat aircraft against the Chinese which would widen the scope of the war. The US would not be able to support or provide any fighter cover. Galbraith could not have acted entirely on his own volition or hunch in advising Nehru so strongly without the backing from the home front. It could well have been the US military as also the CIA that were saying so. They had their own Cold War compulsions. Besides, the US was not very sure in regard to the extent of fissures in Sino-Soviet relations. However, what is of great interest is the fact that Prime Minister Nehru trusted Ambassador Galbraith without any trepidation whatsoever.

Writing in his journal later to be published as ‘Ambassador’s Journal’, on 19 Nov 62, the day Nehru dashed off his missives, Galbraith notes, “The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock .Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected... I think it would be very unwise for them to initiate any air action.” Then he goes to footnote this event by saying, “In the ensuing days, I urged against doing so in the strongest possible fashion”. In his next entry on 21 Nov 1962, he goes on to explain the logic behind his urgings, when he says, “The cities of the Gangetic Plain are accessible from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that the Indians could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet”. It is instructive to note that soon after this entry is an account of Galbraith’s 10 AM meeting with Prime Minister Nehru.

One of the main factors in the calculus of the Americans would have been the fact that the Cold War was at its peak with the Cuban missile crisis unfolding at this very juncture. Any clear siding with the Indians would have provoked the Soviets in some form or the other. That’s how the US did not want to be seen getting too involved on the Indian side. Any such perception would have brought the Soviets closer to the Chinese who had not yet fully parted company. The US on account of Cold War constraints obviously did not want another region getting embroiled in any major war and hence the advice to Nehru to avoid widening the scope of Sino-Indian conflict by employing its air power. Whether the US deliberately exaggerated the Chinese air threat is indeed debatable. The Soviets too could not afford to take a pro India stand in October 1962 because of their pre-occupation with the US on account of Cuban missile face off.

The unfortunate consequence of this canard being sowed deep into the minds of the Indian decision making elite was that it soon began acquiring a life of its own, as a section of the military came to believe that using the IAF offensively would lead to the PLAAF responding with operations to hinder the IAF’s air maintenance of the Indian Army on which it was extremely dependent. That’s how a few requests for close air support by some units engaged on the front with the Chinese were promptly turned down by the army authorities on these very grounds.

1962 war pic 1 1

Despite Nehru’s entreaties, the US help was not forthcoming till after the end of the war, although there are references here and there in regard to the US aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) being present in the Indian Ocean and its movement towards the Bay of Bengal. The US in response to India’s request for help got the Commonwealth countries to come forward and support it in this effort. President Kennedy with the help of British Prime Minister Macmillan worked out a joint military aid package of the order of about $120 million or so for India. Other Commonwealth countries were too roped in to share this responsibility on the grounds that India was more familiar with British and the Commonwealth countries’ equipment and the weapon systems rather than that of the Americans’. The US help therefore, came in the form of non-combat equipment only. It thus became a support from the western powers and not necessarily from the US who was wary of the Soviets’ reaction.

Thus, Ex Shiksha was planned between the air forces of the US, UK, Canada and Australia in order to check the air defence of Delhi and the eastern sector. Later, the help materialised in the form of aircrafts and the equipment from these countries. Besides, the US agreed to train certain number of Indian pilots in US. The US also gave badly needed winter clothing, some transport aircraft and later 500 series Star Saphire air defence radars which were later deployed all along the Himalayas from the west to the far east. Canada sent a squadron of Caribous transport aircraft. UK too provided some support in the form of submarine training to one batch of Indian naval officers. Some of this came free, some on concessional rates and some on full payment.

Interestingly, a stage came when India was able to get the best from both the sides. Right till 1965 war, India was able to acquire major military hardware from the US as well as the Soviet Union. No wonder, India’s non-alignment policy came to be referred as ‘bi-alignment’. Questions about India’s foreign policy began to be raised all over, particularly in the western world. Even within the country, the eyebrows were raised that the architect of India’s non-alignment policy was seeking military intervention by the US forces. However, what really matters is the way one looks at it. National interest must remain paramount, ideology notwithstanding.

Where India went wrong was in its strategic assessment of Chinese intentions that they would not resort to war. But they did and caught us totally off guard. This shattered Nehru and his much coveted non-alignment policy. Being still in “Bhai Bhai, era,” even our intelligence could not adjust to the emerging adverse relationship. To add to the woes, Nehru’s proclivity of ignoring the armed forces that unfortunately remained in World War-II mould all this while till the Chinese shook us resulted in the nation paying this heavy price. However, what needs to be debated in India is as to who sowed the seeds of imagination in the minds of the Indian polity of the time. Nehru was obviously not advised correctly or professionally. The unexpected Chinese onslaught and consequent rout of the Indian Army led Nehru and his advisors to overestimate

Chinese politico-military objectives.

Could the Indian Air Force Have Tilted the Scales in the 1962 War With China?

In October 1962 the Chinese Army moved against Indian positions in the East and Ladakh. The positions which were lightly held gave way in the face of the Chinese assault. The so called Macmohan Line in the East was breached and the posts in Ladakh fell after some resistance. The Indian Army was taken totally by surprise. This soon turned into a ignominious retreat. One of the reasons was paucity of equipment, but a more important reason was the mindset of the General Staff that had been conditioned to think of only Pakistan as the probable opponent.

The result of the attack had a demoralizing effect on the Indian leadership and the Indian Army. This state of affairs can squarely laid at the doorstep of successive Army Chiefs right from General Cariappa to General Thapar who abandoned their duty in conditioning the Army to face China. No mountain exercise was ever conducted for the troops and the Staff College had only exercises on battles in the plains of Punjab and deserts of Rajasthan as possible scenarios of a conflict. The Indian Air Force at that time had a mix of Gnats, Hunters, Mystere's, Canberra's and MIG 21.

The Eastern Command was in existence, but the IAF never carried out any exercises for hill attacks and operations. All the exercises were carried out for operations in the plains. This is hard to stomach now and the role of successive Air Chiefs from Air Marshal S Mukherjee down wards needs evaluation. The IAF was not conditioned for any form of operation in the hills and the heights of the Himalayas. However the IAF was combat ready for operations in the plains. Thus when the PLA moved in a logical corollary would have been to use the IAF as a ground support to blunt the Chinese offensive. This however did not happen and the Army fought it's battle without Air Support. Thus the cardinal principle of Douhet was thrown to the winds.

It is a fact of history that the Indian Air Force did not take part in the operations. It has never been satisfactorily explained as to why the IAF was not used in close support operations. Who took the fatal decision not to deploy the IAF . Was it Nehru, the Army Chief General Thapar or the Air Chief. There is no answer to this question. Perhaps the only plausible answer is that fear of the unknown and retaliation by the PLAAF based in Tibet may have clouded the thought process. This shows a psychosis of fear that at that time pervaded the Indian Government and Armed Forces.

The Air Chief himself perhaps was too numbed by the turn of events. In addition the fact that the IAF had never even had a practice exercise in hill operations, must have weighed heavily on the Air Chief. For this alone Air Marshal Aspi Engineer must stand in the dock as he headed the IAF at that time. Another point is the psychosis of fear that was built up about the capability of the PLAAF which was greatly exaggerated. In real terms the Peoples Army Air Force had outdated aircraft which could not operate with full payload from the airfields in Tibet because of the height factor of the airfields.

All this is mentioned by Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwari in his article in the Indian Defense review. Much water has flowed down the river since then, but future generations must be made aware that the psychosis of fear must never govern a military decision. This is unfortunately what happened in 1962. As per AVM AK Tiwari 'In final analysis the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China.

It may be mentioned here, though with the advantage of hindsight that during the period leading from the 62 war with India to its 1979 war with Vietnam, the PLAAF had shown a marked bias towards Air Defence as against Offensive Air Operations. That this was inspite of having more capable bomber like the Tu-16/H-6 at the time implies that this predilection towards Air Defence had more to do with their air force doctrine rather than the ‘short legs’ of its aircraft. Would it therefore, with the hindsight of course, be correct to say that the PLAAF in all likelihood would not have used its offensive power against Indian cities? This is a question that can perhaps never be answered

In comparison, India had technologically advance aircraft comprising Toofanis, Mysteres, Gnats, Hunters and the Canberras. Some of these aircraft were in location in the eastern sector already, though the Air Defence set up was rather rudimentary. With inherent flexibility that the air power has, it would have not taken much time for the IAF to reinforce the sector with requisite assets.

Unfortunately, the Air Force too was not as clear and certain as it ought to have been, due to the lack of requisite intelligence inputs. And that is the reason indeed for not having any in-depth study on Chinese capabilities in Tibet in hand prior to the start of war. Lack of intelligence on China’s capabilities and their intentions was obviously the limiting factor resulting in India not being as ready as required by the emerging scenario. The fear of Chinese retaliation seemed to have weighed so heavily that it coloured all our decisions. In light of the fact that the Henderson Brookes report is unlikely to be released for public scrutiny, the only source of information in this regard would be the few surviving senior officers of the day.

Ambassador Galbraith went to a great length in pressurising Nehru to desist from using combat aircraft against the Chinese which would widen the scope of the war. The US would not be able to support or provide any fighter cover. Galbraith could not have acted entirely on his own volition or hunch in advising Nehru so strongly without the backing from the home front. It could well have been the US military as also the CIA that were saying so. They had their own Cold War compulsions. Besides, the US was not very sure in regard to the extent of fissures in Sino-Soviet relations. However, what is of great interest is the fact that Prime Minister Nehru trusted Ambassador Galbraith without any trepidation whatsoever.

Writing in his journal later to be published as ‘Ambassador’s Journal’, on 19 Nov 62, the day Nehru dashed off his missives, Galbraith notes, “The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock .Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected... I think it would be very unwise for them to initiate any air action.” Then he goes to footnote this event by saying, “In the ensuing days, I urged against doing so in the strongest possible fashion”. In his next entry on 21 Nov 1962, he goes on to explain the logic behind his urgings, when he says, “The cities of the Gangetic Plain are accessible from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that the Indians could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet”. It is instructive to note that soon after this entry is an account of Galbraith’s 10 AM meeting with Prime Minister Nehru.

One of the main factors in the calculus of the Americans would have been the fact that the Cold War was at its peak with the Cuban missile crisis unfolding at this very juncture. Any clear siding with the Indians would have provoked the Soviets in some form or the other. That’s how the US did not want to be seen getting too involved on the Indian side. Any such perception would have brought the Soviets closer to the Chinese who had not yet fully parted company. The US on account of Cold War constraints obviously did not want another region getting embroiled in any major war and hence the advice to Nehru to avoid widening the scope of Sino-Indian conflict by employing its air power. Whether the US deliberately exaggerated the Chinese air threat is indeed debatable. The Soviets too could not afford to take a pro India stand in October 1962 because of their pre-occupation with the US on account of Cuban missile face off.

The unfortunate consequence of this canard being sowed deep into the minds of the Indian decision making elite was that it soon began acquiring a life of its own, as a section of the military came to believe that using the IAF offensively would lead to the PLAAF responding with operations to hinder the IAF’s air maintenance of the Indian Army on which it was extremely dependent. That’s how a few requests for close air support by some units engaged on the front with the Chinese were promptly turned down by the army authorities on these very grounds.

1962 war pic 1 1

Despite Nehru’s entreaties, the US help was not forthcoming till after the end of the war, although there are references here and there in regard to the US aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) being present in the Indian Ocean and its movement towards the Bay of Bengal. The US in response to India’s request for help got the Commonwealth countries to come forward and support it in this effort. President Kennedy with the help of British Prime Minister Macmillan worked out a joint military aid package of the order of about $120 million or so for India. Other Commonwealth countries were too roped in to share this responsibility on the grounds that India was more familiar with British and the Commonwealth countries’ equipment and the weapon systems rather than that of the Americans’. The US help therefore, came in the form of non-combat equipment only. It thus became a support from the western powers and not necessarily from the US who was wary of the Soviets’ reaction.

Thus, Ex Shiksha was planned between the air forces of the US, UK, Canada and Australia in order to check the air defence of Delhi and the eastern sector. Later, the help materialised in the form of aircrafts and the equipment from these countries. Besides, the US agreed to train certain number of Indian pilots in US. The US also gave badly needed winter clothing, some transport aircraft and later 500 series Star Saphire air defence radars which were later deployed all along the Himalayas from the west to the far east. Canada sent a squadron of Caribous transport aircraft. UK too provided some support in the form of submarine training to one batch of Indian naval officers. Some of this came free, some on concessional rates and some on full payment.

Interestingly, a stage came when India was able to get the best from both the sides. Right till 1965 war, India was able to acquire major military hardware from the US as well as the Soviet Union. No wonder, India’s non-alignment policy came to be referred as ‘bi-alignment’. Questions about India’s foreign policy began to be raised all over, particularly in the western world. Even within the country, the eyebrows were raised that the architect of India’s non-alignment policy was seeking military intervention by the US forces. However, what really matters is the way one looks at it. National interest must remain paramount, ideology notwithstanding.

Where India went wrong was in its strategic assessment of Chinese intentions that they would not resort to war. But they did and caught us totally off guard. This shattered Nehru and his much coveted non-alignment policy. Being still in “Bhai Bhai, era,” even our intelligence could not adjust to the emerging adverse relationship. To add to the woes, Nehru’s proclivity of ignoring the armed forces that unfortunately remained in World War-II mould all this while till the Chinese shook us resulted in the nation paying this heavy price. However, what needs to be debated in India is as to who sowed the seeds of imagination in the minds of the Indian polity of the time. Nehru was obviously not advised correctly or professionally. The unexpected Chinese onslaught and consequent rout of the Indian Army led Nehru and his advisors to overestimate
Chinese politico-military objectives.

Could the Indian Air Force Have Tilted the Scales in the 1962 War With China?

In October 1962 the Chinese Army moved against Indian positions in the East and Ladakh. The positions which were lightly held gave way in the face of the Chinese assault. The so called Macmohan Line in the East was breached and the posts in Ladakh fell after some resistance. The Indian Army was taken totally by surprise. This soon turned into a ignominious retreat. One of the reasons was paucity of equipment, but a more important reason was the mindset of the General Staff that had been conditioned to think of only Pakistan as the probable opponent.

The result of the attack had a demoralizing effect on the Indian leadership and the Indian Army. This state of affairs can squarely laid at the doorstep of successive Army Chiefs right from General Cariappa to General Thapar who abandoned their duty in conditioning the Army to face China. No mountain exercise was ever conducted for the troops and the Staff College had only exercises on battles in the plains of Punjab and deserts of Rajasthan as possible scenarios of a conflict. The Indian Air Force at that time had a mix of Gnats, Hunters, Mystere's, Canberra's and MIG 21.

The Eastern Command was in existence, but the IAF never carried out any exercises for hill attacks and operations. All the exercises were carried out for operations in the plains. This is hard to stomach now and the role of successive Air Chiefs from Air Marshal S Mukherjee down wards needs evaluation. The IAF was not conditioned for any form of operation in the hills and the heights of the Himalayas. However the IAF was combat ready for operations in the plains. Thus when the PLA moved in a logical corollary would have been to use the IAF as a ground support to blunt the Chinese offensive. This however did not happen and the Army fought it's battle without Air Support. Thus the cardinal principle of Douhet was thrown to the winds.

It is a fact of history that the Indian Air Force did not take part in the operations. It has never been satisfactorily explained as to why the IAF was not used in close support operations. Who took the fatal decision not to deploy the IAF . Was it Nehru, the Army Chief General Thapar or the Air Chief. There is no answer to this question. Perhaps the only plausible answer is that fear of the unknown and retaliation by the PLAAF based in Tibet may have clouded the thought process. This shows a psychosis of fear that at that time pervaded the Indian Government and Armed Forces.

The Air Chief himself perhaps was too numbed by the turn of events. In addition the fact that the IAF had never even had a practice exercise in hill operations, must have weighed heavily on the Air Chief. For this alone Air Marshal Aspi Engineer must stand in the dock as he headed the IAF at that time. Another point is the psychosis of fear that was built up about the capability of the PLAAF which was greatly exaggerated. In real terms the Peoples Army Air Force had outdated aircraft which could not operate with full payload from the airfields in Tibet because of the height factor of the airfields.

All this is mentioned by Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwari in his article in the Indian Defense review. Much water has flowed down the river since then, but future generations must be made aware that the psychosis of fear must never govern a military decision. This is unfortunately what happened in 1962. As per AVM AK Tiwari 'In final analysis the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China.

चुकून डब्बल अपलोड झाल गेलय.खाली दिलेली मराठीतील वाक्ये पुन्हा येइपर्यन्त वाचणे; नन्तर डब्बल अपलोड सुरु होतय.
"भारतिय वायु सेनेचा १९६२ च्या युद्धात का उपयोग केला गेला नाही य बद्दल काही माहिती आत्ताच् हाती आली आहे. भाषान्तर करावयास वेळ लागेल म्हणुन इन्ग्रजीतच ती देत आहे."

मी सुद्धा इतिहास प्रेमी आहे. तुम्ही खुप सुंदर लिखाण करता.

अजुन वाचायला आवडेल. लिहित रहा.

छान लेख.